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Justice Powell’s leading opinion in the Bakke case 
stressed educational diversity over state responsibility. 
However, even when “divers#’cation” fails as a goal, 
the desire to overcome the effects of past 
discrimination may nonetheless avail. 
what Bakke leaves 
to the states: 
preliminary thoughts 
robert m. o’neil 
The resolution of the Bakke case, despite the jagged split within the 
Court, provides a measure of relief to the academic community. While 
many questions remain unanswered, some guidance has at long last 
been provided - surely much more than the unhappy disposition of 
DeFunis provided four years ago. In the early months after the deci- 
sion, many efforts have been made to determine the meaning and the 
scope of the decision (see McCormack, 1978). Further litigation will be 
required, and is in fact already in the courts, as the vehicle for further 
resolution of the many questions the Supreme Court left open. 
For institutions of higher learning, major attention is likely to 
focus on the “diversity” which Justice Powell has said a college or uni- 
versity may seek through race-conscious admissions policies. Since that 
topic has been extensively covered elsewhere, nothing will be said 
about it here. Instead, the focus will be on the other principal basis for 
validation of preferential admission programs - a commitment to alle- 
viate the effects of past racial discrimination. This second rationale 
played no major part in Justice Powell’s opinion, not only because the 
University of California Regents had not purported to make the requi- 
site findings, but because in Powell’s view they lacked the capacity to 
make them. Thus a host of questions were reserved for a later case- 
what branches of government could make such findings, how explicit 
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they need be, what scope should be given to findings made at an earlier 
time and for a different purpose, and so on through a lengthy list of 
important issues. 
In order to place the “past discrimination” issue in constitu- 
tional perspective, it may be useful to review very briefly the alignment 
of the Justices on the relevant questions. In fact, the Supreme Court 
rendered two judgments, each by a different 5-4 majority: one, that 
the Davis medical admissions program was unlawful; the other, that a 
total ban on use of race (such as the California Supreme Court had 
decreed) was improper. Two fairly distinct poles thus emerge along a 
rather wide spectrum of possible admission policies. At one end, both 
the Brennan group and the Stevens group (and presumably Justice 
Powell) would have sustained certain practices - for example, the pref- 
erential allocation of minority fellowships under a special program 
enacted for this precise purpose by Congress. An institution could 
properly use federal funds in this way for one simple reason: Congress 
enacted in 1964 the ban on which the Stevens opinion turned, and 
Congress could thus presumably make exceptions to that ban. On this 
basis the present Court might well uphold the so-called “ten percent 
set-aside’’ in the Public Works Employment Act, which has been the 
subject of much litigation, with conflicting results in the lower federal 
courts. This is one end of the scale: there may be other programs that 
would also be acceptable to the whole Court, but this is the clearest 
example. 
At the other end of the spectrum there are policies which would 
be held unlawful even by the Brennan group. A ractxonscious prefer- 
ence, for example, which cast a stigma on a minority group, would run 
afoul of the Brennan opinion. Any program not designed to remedy 
the effects of discrimination against the designated group- for exam- 
ple, a preference based on sheer whim or political influence, with no 
background of exclusion or denial of opportunity- would be invalid. 
Moreover, a race-conscious remedy must, in the view of the Brennan 
group, be designed “to remove the disparate racial impact (the institu- 
tion’s) actions might otherwise have”- that is, its policies must be part 
of the solution even though they may not have been part of the problem. 
This analysis brings us to the heart of the difference between 
the Brennan and Powell approaches, and helps to explain why two 
wings of the Court that agreed in principle on the use of race diverged 
when it came to the specific admissions program. Basically, Justice 
Powell believed that the University of California had no business using 
race to remedy discrimination which it had not itself created-even 
though blacks and Chicanos may well have been denied equal opportu- 
nity in the elementary and secondary schools of California, Chinese 
may have been denied employment, and Japanese may have been dis- 
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advantaged in business and land ownership. The University, in short, 
could correct the injustices which it had caused, but could not use race 
to cure the effects of a general condition of discrimination or exclusion. 
We must then look more closely at the fourth justification 
which Justice Powell offered for use of race: “The State,” he wrote, 
“certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or 
eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimi- 
nation” (1978, pp. 3-7). But the judgment required to invoke this prin- 
ciple was not one the University itself could make. Not only had the Uni- 
versity of California not in fact found racial discrimination in its past 
admission policies, but in Justice Powell’s view “it was in no position to 
do so.” The mission of the University, he continued, “is education, not 
the formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication of particu- 
lar claims of illegality.” (It  is noteworthy that the Regents of the Uni- 
versity of California are in fact a constitutional body-one of twenty- 
two state universities in the country which enjoys such status. Thus 
their inability to make such a judgment would apply more clearly to 
the greater number of public college and university governing boards 
which are creatures of legislation rather than of the constitution.) 
There is no clear explanation for Justice Powell’s belief that the 
critical judgment must be made by some entity other than the regents 
or trustees. Surely he could not be unaware of the processes by which 
governing boards work. Perhaps he felt that university trustees have a 
kind of self-interest that is not wholly to be trusted in such matters, or 
that they are subject to kinds of pressures on the campus from which 
other agencies are more isolated. There is also a strong suggestion that 
such sensitive decisions should be made by a politically accountable 
body, which is answerable to the electorate for the uneven dispensation 
of burdens and benefits-especially where the benefit is as valuable as 
admission to a state medical school. Justice Powell may also have felt 
that the governing board of a single university might fail to recognize 
all competing claimants, and might thus through incomplete judg- 
ment, disfavor some eligible minorities. The reasons for Justice 
Powell’s distrust of the university Regents remain obscure, and need to 
be probed more fully at a later time. Even the question whether, under 
different conditions, the University of California Regents might be 
trusted to make such sensitive decisions, may remain open because the 
facts of the Bakke case did not really present it to the Court. For the 
moment, however, we may accept the limitation and turn to other pos- 
sible governmental sources of the critical judgment which triggers the 
“past discrimination” basis of race-conscious policies. 
Clearest and most obvious among the decision-makers are the 
courts. A judicial finding of past racial discrimination would permit 
race-conscious remedies as readily as in the school desegregation cases- 
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with which Justice Powell is intimately familiar, and which he cited 
with obvious approval. The higher education systems of some south- 
eastern states may well be the object of judicial findings which not only 
permit but may actually require race-conscious rernedies. Surely the 
Supreme Court would not preclude the use of race to remedy a condi- 
tion which a lower court has held must be corrected -- unless, of course, 
the underlying judgment were to be reversed. 
There is a more difficult question on the judicial side: What of 
the old decrees, going back to the 1940s and 1950s--some before and 
others just after Brown v. Board of Education- finding racial discrim- 
ination in certain southern state universities? The Court did not say 
much about the duration of such a basis for race-conscious policies. 
Justice Blackmun, in his brief separate opinion, spoke of a “transitional 
inequality” and expressed the hope that a time would come when race- 
conscious remedies would no longer be necessary. There is no clear 
benchmark by which to gauge that time. A strong argument could 
therefore be made that Justice Powell’s opinion has breathed new life 
into old cases like Sweatt v. Painter and the Georgia and Alabama 
cases of the mid-l950s, to the extent that a justification beyond the 
recent dual-system litigation may be needed. 
So much for the role of the courts. The role of legislatures and 
administrative bodies is less clear. What, for example, of a state higher 
education coordinating board or agency? Could it make findings of 
discrimination which would be acceptable where those of the univer- 
sity’s own governing boards might not be? Its business, too, is educa- 
tion, and it does not customarily engage in “adjudication of particular 
claims of illegality,” to use Justice Powell’s phrase. Perhaps what he 
had in mind is state antidiscrimination boards or commissions, which 
know less about higher education but do have at least a quasi-judicial 
role and thus might well made such findings about the admission or 
financial aid policies of a particular college or university. It would now 
appear that such a judgment, even in an individual grievance case, 
would allow a university to do what the University of California at 
Davis could not do in the absence of such findings. (Let me raise one 
major caution at this point: We know how the Brennan group would 
resolve such a case; since they found the Davis program valid as it was, 
they would more easily have reached that conclusion after an adminis- 
trative finding of discrimination. We think Justice Powell would now 
join them to make a fifth. But we know nothing of the view of the 
Stevens group, who scrupulously avoided going beyond the facts of the 
Bakke case and the reach of Title VI. They would presumably allow 
race-conscious remedies after a court had found discrimination - to 
the same extent as in the public school cases-but how far they would 
go with the “legislative and administrative” portion of the Powell opin- 
ion is unclear. Five votes makes a court, to be sure, but it is a margin 
too close for comfort on questions as portentous as these.) 
Finally, we come to the possible role of the legislature. It seems 
that Justice Powell-and of course the Brennan group-would permit 
a college or university to use race, for example to implement a state 
equal opportunity program in admission or financial aid. Even if the 
statute did not in terms declare that the colleges and universities of the 
state had in the past been guilty of racial discrimination-a declara- 
tion which lawmakers would understandably view with some caution 
the enactment and the clear purpose of the program might meet the 
Powell test. On the other hand, two federal laws which were cited in 
this context-one dealing with voting rights and the other with special 
bilingual education- are somewhat more explicit in finding past dis- 
crimination than is the preamble of the typical equal opportunity 
scholarship law. Thus the issue is a difficult and sensitive one: To say 
too little may run the risk that the program will be held legally inade- 
quate under the Powell test; on the other hand, to say enough to 
invoke that test with certainty risks admitting a culpability which legis- 
lators and university officials are loath to admit solely for the purpose 
of expanding opportunity. Moreover, some such programs now extend 
to groups that could not really be said to have been discriminated 
against in the past by college admissions or financial aid policies. The 
framing of state legislation in this area thus becomes a decliate and 
demanding task, and there will probably be many more cases defining 
the limits on use of race under state laws and agency rulings. 
Obviously we have only scratched the surface. Since the major 
attention in the Bakke opinions- the Powell and Brennan opinions at 
least - was devoted to the “diversity” issue, we are left to speculate on 
the possible application of the other major rationale. Even before 
Bakke we would have assumed that a state college or university could 
take steps to remedy past discrimination which, in the judgment of a 
court, its own past exclusionist admission policies had caused. Less 
clearly understood is the possible significance of administrative or leg- 
islative findings of the kind which Justice Powell has now suggested 
may be constitutionally relevant. It remains to be determined to what 
extent such findings- both explicit and implicit-may now serve to 
validate race-conscious admission policies which would have been 
vulnerable in the past. Even where “diversification” fails as a goal, the 
desire to overcome the effects of past discrimination may nonetheless 
avail. 
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